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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: ARE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
REASONABLE FOR COMMUNICATIONS BROADCAST
VIA CORDLESS OR CELLULAR TELEPHONES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The adversarial justice system of the United States has histori-
cally recognized the need to protect confidences communicated by
clients to their attorneys.' When entrusted solely to an attorney,
client confidences should be divulged by that attorney only to the
extent necessary for resolution of the client's case or when disclosure
is compelled by the standards of professional ethics. 2 Unfortunately,
however, client confidences are often divulged unintentionally because
the media of exchange chosen for communication are susceptible to
interception and eavesdropping by persons who should not be privy
to the communique.' This Comment analyzes only situations in which
confidential communications are unknowingly disclosed because of
the medium of communication and not those situations in which a
lawyer knowingly or lawfully divulges client communications. 4
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs Canon 6 (1908) ("The obligation to
represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidences have been reposed.").
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1987). Maryland's Rules of Professional
Conduct are set forth under Rule 1230 and are located in Appendix F to the
Maryland Rules. See MD. RULE 1230.
3. See Congressional Findings Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat.
211 (1968) (finding that "there has been extensive wiretapping carried on
without legal sanction and without the consent of any of the parties to the
conversation"); Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Underpinnings of Privacy Protec-
tion; History of Privacy Protection Issues, 36 COMM. OF THE ACM 69 (Aug.
1993).
4. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct set forth several circumstances
where an attorney may lawfully divulge client confidences. See, e.g., MD.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(b) (1987) (regarding the duties of
candor towards the tribunal which "continue to the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information oth-
erwise protected by Rule 1.6"); MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
4.1 (1987) (admonishing attorneys against making knowingly false statements
to third persons of material facts or law or failing to disclose material facts
to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client, even if compliance requires disclosures of infor-
mation protected by Rule 1.6).
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In the last decade, the dramatic advances of telecommunications
have enabled millions of people to communicate through a myriad
of electronic media,' including facsimiles, electronic mail, cordless
phones, cellular car phones, and air phones. Many of these media
are connected by satellites that form a communication labyrinth,
evermore complex and susceptible to eavesdropping or wiretapping. 6
Radio wave transmissions are particularly susceptible to interception
by the general public through the use of commercially marketed
receivers and scanners. 7 The vulnerability of electronic communication
to eavesdropping or wiretapping led to the enactment of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (hereinafter ECPA)8
The ECPA created a veil of privacy around some of the aforemen-
tioned communications. Several states have followed congressional
efforts to protect the privacy of electronic communications while
permitting electronic surveillance by officers of the law with prior
court approval.9
5. See COMM. DAILY, April 14, 1994, at 6 (citing forecast by the Hershel Shosteck
Association that there will be 16 million cellular phone subscribers in 1994, an
increase from 11 million subscribers in 1993); Grace Casselman, Visionaries
Gather in Toronto To Shed Light on Info Highway, 10 COMPUTER DEALER
NEWS 1 (Feb. 1994) (referring to Eric Schmidt, C.E.O. for Sun Microsystems,
Inc., who stated that there were, at that time, 20 million on-line users for the
Internet computer network).
6. See generally JAmEs G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1995).
7. See infra Part III.
8. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 101-
303, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-26)
[hereinafter ECPA]. This Comment will only address the portion codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21.
9. The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act is codified at MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -414 (1995 & Supp. 1995)
[hereinafter MWESA]. See also ALA. CODE §§ 13A-I 1-30 to -37 (1994); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 12.37.010 to .130, 42.20.300 to .390 (Supp. 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3004 to -3017 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120
(Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629 to 637.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-15-101 to -104, 18-9-302 to -305 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to -189, 54-41a to -41t (West
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1987 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-541 to -556 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01 to .10 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to -69 (1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 803-41 to -48 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to
-6709 (1987 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/108B-1 to 108B-
7 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); IowA CODE ANN. § 808B (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2518 (1988 & Supp. 1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1302 to :1312 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-713 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); MAsS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01
to .13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to -537 (1993
& Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 542.400 to .422 (Vernon Supp. 1995);
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To fall within the protection afforded by federal and state
statutory enactments, an electronic communication must be cloaked
in a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 0 Absent this expectation,
such communications are admissible into evidence, and the liability
of the attorney using this communication method may be at stake
under the rules of professional ethics and general tort law." Differ-
ences between federal and local law and different interpretations
among the various federal circuits have led to a split of authority
on the question of whether individuals communicating over the radio
waves are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications. 12 Maryland courts and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have not ruled on the issue of whether
communications over radio waves are entitled to a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.
This Comment argues that attorneys should take steps to ensure
that their radio wave communications are enveloped in a reasonable
expectation of privacy and are protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege. An attorney has a duty to inform his client of the evidentiary
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.410
to .515, 200.610 to .690 (Michie 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A.1 to
-.11 (1986 & Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-2 to -24 (West 1985
& Supp. 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 250.00 to .05 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995); 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws
407; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-01 to -04 (1985 & Supp. 1991); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51 to .66 (Baldwin 1993 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 176.2 to .13 (West 1994); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 133.721 to .739 (1993);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5781 (1983 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-35-21, -24, 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-
35A-1 to -34 (1988 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-601 to -604,
40-6-301 to -310 (Supp. 1994); TEX. Cirv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 123.001
- .003 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 16.01 - .05 (West
1994); TEX. CODE CRIs. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -16 (1995 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
61 to -70.3 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030 - .140 (West
1988 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-ID-1 to -16 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27 - .33 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§
7-3-601 to -610 (1995).
10. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967) (holding that
the test concerning the privacy of communications is whether the person
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy).
11. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provide that a "lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987). In essence, an attorney may be under a duty to
inform the client of the nature of the attorney-client privilege and the need to
communicate via private media. See also MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(a) (1987) (stating that a "lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client"). See generally infra Part V.
12. See generally infra Part IV.
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implications of radio wave communications that, although meant to
be private, may be overheard by "eavesdroppers."'" A failure to
inform a client of the possibility that radio wave communications
can jeopardize evidentiary and attorney-client privileges may be
grounds for malpractice actions and disciplinary sanctions. 4
Part II of this Comment discusses the elements of attorney
malpractice, with emphasis on the attorney's duty of confidentiality
and the duty to explain matters to the client so that the client can
make informed decisions regarding representation. Part III explores
the nature of cordless and cellular phones, the processes by which
such phones transmit communications, and the ease with which such
communications can be intercepted. Part IV examines case law that
has applied and interpreted wiretapping statutes around the country.
Contradictory views and the bases for divergence will also be dis-
cussed. Parts II through IV of this Comment provide background
for Part V, which examines case law relative to radio wave com-
munications and applies the law to the rules of professional conduct.
Part V also examines an attorney's liability, and the potential sanc-
tions available, for failure to abide by the rules of professional
conduct. Finally, Part VI proposes measures that attorneys should
take to guard against exposing client confidences over radio wave
communications.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE
Generally, in order to succeed in a negligence action, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant's breach of a duty of care proximately
caused the plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable injury. 5 To recover
for attorney malpractice, however, the plaintiff must prove an ad-
ditional element of privity, which is established by demonstrating the
existence of the attorney-client relationship. 6 An attorney's duties
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983); MD. RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987) (requiring a lawyer to explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to obtain the client's informed
consent).
14. See infra Parts II and V.
15. E.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 448, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993).
16. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 128, 492 A.2d 618, 624 (1985) (citing
Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 612, 31 A.2d 312, 315 (1943), for the adoption
of the tripartite test to determine privity which requires: "(1) the attorney's
employment; (2) [the attorney's] neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) loss to
the client proximately caused by that neglect of duty"). The Flaherty court
focused on the first element of this test, which traditionally required strict
privity between the plaintiff-client and the defendant-attorney. Id. The Flaherty
court noted, however, that the third party beneficiary theory is an exception
to the privity requirement. Id. The third party beneficiary theory was first
accepted in Maryland in Prescott v. Coppage. Id. at 129, 492 A.2d at 624
(citing Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972)).
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toward his client can be both implied at law 7 and explicitly defined
by a contractual arrangement between the attorney and the client. 3
Perhaps the most well known duty that an attorney owes to a
client is the duty to keep attorney-client communications confidential.
This duty was amended in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 9 to eliminate the element of knowledge of the disclosure of
confidential communications. Thus, an attorney may now breach the
duty of confidentiality without even being aware of having done so.2°
Maryland has adopted the same rule regarding the duty of confiden-
tiality imposed by the ABA Model Rules. In Maryland, Rule 1.6(a)
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides that an
attorney "shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless one of several limited exceptions applies." ' 2' Al-
though a plain reading of this rule suggests an absolute prohibition
against divulging confidential communications, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland recently held otherwise.22 The court of appeals held:
"There must be the potential for some harm to the client's interest
before an attorney will be considered . . . to be subject to discipline,
for having revealed 'information relating to representation of a
client.' 23
In addition to an attorney's duty to maintain the confidentiality
of client communications, an attorney also has the duty, under Rule
1.4(b), to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the represen-
tation. '" This duty places a burden upon the attorney to inform the
17. See generally MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987).
18. Cf. Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (adopting the
third party beneficiary rule for imposing the duty of reasonable care upon the
attorney). See generally Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943)
(requiring strict privity of contract between attorney and client before a duty
to the client arises). Wloderak v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d 774 (1940).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (stating that "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation" (emphasis added)).
20. Prior to the Model Rules, the ABA ethical requirements stated that "a lawyer
shall not knowingly: (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client," thus,
ignorance of an inadvertent disclosure was a defense. ABA MODEL CODE OF
PRoFESsIoNAL REsPONsiBmrrY DR 4-101(B) (1969) (emphasis added).
21. MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1987).
22. Harris v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 625 A.2d 941 (1993).
23. Id. at 608, 625 A.2d at 946 (1993) (quoting MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1987)). Thus, inadvertent or intentional disclosures of
harmless client confidences will not subject an attorney to discipline. See Harris
v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 625 A.2d 941 (1993). However,
inadvertent disclosures of harmful confidences could subject an attorney to
discipline and to liability if the client is damaged in some way. Id.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987).
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client that any communications with the attorney should be made
under confidential circumstances. In addition, the attorney should
ensure that his communications to the client are confidential within
the dictates of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. 25
A client cannot maintain an action against his attorney for a
breach of the duties imposed by Rule 1.6(a) and Rule 1.4(b) unless
that breach results in a legally cognizable injury.26 This injury may
be either the loss of a lawsuit or other legally cognizable damages;
otherwise the breach of duty "would be damnum absque injuria"
(damage absent injury).27 Furthermore, for an attorney to be subject
to discipline for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
"[tihere must be some potential for some harm to the client's
interest. "28 Thus, an attorney will not be subject to disciplinary
action in Maryland if he intentionally or inadvertently reveals non-
harmful, confidential client information. 29
III. THE NATURE OF CORDLESS AND CELLULAR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A cellular or cordless telephone is a communication device that
transforms sound waves into radio waves to be broadcast and trans-
forms radio waves into sound waves to be received.30 A cellular or
cordless communication is transmitted on a specific frequency to a
25. See generally Joanne Pitulla, Perils of Office Tech, 77 A.B.A. J. 102, 102(Oct. 1991) (noting that the Illinois State Bar Association has concluded that
a client has a reasonable right to presume that a communication with his
attorney is confidential).
26. See generally Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985). Prescott
v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke,
259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970); Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d
312 (1943); Wloderak v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d 774 (1940).
27. Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 553, 270 A.2d 662, 668 (1970)
(stating that "[in order for a client to recover damages against an attorney
for negligent conduct ... the client must show that injury proximately resulted
to the client from [the attorney's] negligent act"); see also Kendall v. Rogers,
181 Md. 606, 612, 31 A.2d 312, 315 (1943).
28. Harris v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 608, 625 A.2d 941, 947 (1993).
In Harris, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there had to be "some
potential for some harm to the client's interest before an attorney w[ould] be
considered to be subject to discipline for having revealed 'information relating
to representation of a client."' Id. (quoting MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1987)).
29. See id.
30. For a further discussion of cellular and cordless phone communications in
technical detail, see generally K. FUJIMATO & J.R. JAMES, MOBILE ANTENNA
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, 17-365 (1994); WIIM GOsLING, RADIO RECEVERS, 264-
84 (1986); and RAYMOND C.V. MACARIO, CELLULAR RADIO-PRINCIPLES AND
DESIGN (1993).
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receiver supplied by the telephone company which, in turn, transmits
the signal via a land-based line to a regular phone.3 In reverse, the
transmission from a regular phone to the telephone company's trans-
mitter is broadcast via radio waves to the original cellular or cordless
telephone. Transmissions are said to be "in the clear" when no
attempt is made to encrypt, scramble, or distort the signal from
either the cellular or cordless telephone or from the transmitter.3 2
The essential difference between cellular and cordless phones lies in
the territorial area covered by the broadcast transmissions. 31
"In the clear" transmissions are readily audible to any person
with a radio receiver within the area of the transmission's broadcast,
if the transmission's frequency is within the scope of the radio receiver
frequencies . 4 A tuning device within the receiver searches for active
frequencies within its range and focuses on the specific frequencies
used by unsuspecting callers. 35 Some radio receivers may be limited
to a certain range of frequencies such as AM only or AM and FM
commercial radio stations. 36 Other receivers may have the capability
of accessing the full spectrum of radio waves, thus enabling the
receipt of thousands of signals including police, fire, railroad, am-
bulance, aircraft, marine, citizens band, and cellular and cordless
telephone broadcasts.3 7 In essence, the user of a cellular or cordless
31. See FunMATO & JAMEs, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
32. See FUJMATO & JAMms, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
33. To scan a cordless phone communication, a receiver must be within 300 feet
of the transmission. Victor Dricks, Eavesdroppers Find Cordless Phones To
Be Easy Targets; Arrests in Alleged Murder Plot Prove Lack of Privacy, THE
PHOENrX GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al (stating that cordless phone com-
munications can be heard up to one-half-mile away from the transmission or
up to a mile with advanced antennas); see also Mozo v. State 632 So. 2d 623,
626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (observing that cordless phone signals may be
intercepted within a range of 1000 feet). The cellular phone industry transmits
phone calls via transmitters centered in hexagonal cells arranged in a beehive
matrix across the United States. A typical cell radius for cellular communica-
tions extends between 2 kilometers for high density areas and up to 20
kilometers for rural areas. However, the broadcast transmission from either a
user's car or the phone company's transmitter usually extends beyond the size
of the cell, because the cell's radius is set at the optimal distance from the
transmitter/receiver rather than at the outer limits of the transmission. FUIMATO
& JAMEs, supra note 30, at 149; MAcAmno, supra note 30, at 7-8.
34. See FUJIMATO & JAMS, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
35. See FUnmATO & JAMES, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
36. See FUjmATO & JAMES, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
37. See FUnMATO & JAMEs, supra note 30; GOSLING, supra note 30; MACARIO,
supra note 30.
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telephone is effectively a mobile amateur radio station in nearly every
respect except that the user is limited in the scope of frequencies
that he may broadcast and receive."'
Once a broadcast transmission of a conversation is converted
into radio waves, that transmission may be heard by any other
receivers in the broadcast area capable of tuning into that transmis-
sion's frequency. During the 1980s and early 1990s, receivers were
commercially marketed throughout the United States.3 9 Due to the
increasing use of these receivers to intercept cellular phone conver-
sations, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission
to prescribe regulations banning the manufacture and sale of such
receivers.40 These regulations, however, do not prevent the lawful use
of scanners already owned by the millions who listen to radio wave
communications .41
IV. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW
A fundamental part of the law relating to the attorney-client
relationship requires communications between the attorney and client
to be shrouded in a reasonable expectation of privacy. 42 Stated
otherwise, the attorney-client privilege "is limited to those commu-
nications which the client either expressly made confidential or which
38. Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 586-87 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., MACARIO, supra note 30.
39. Dricks, supra note 33, at Al (estimating that 10 million radio hobbyists
routinely eavesdrop on cellular and cordless communications).
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 302a(d) (Supp. 1993), which states:
(1) Within 180 days after October 28, 1992, the Commission shall
prescribe and make effective regulations denying equipment authori-
zation . . . for any scanning receiver that is capable of-
(A) receiving transmissions in the frequencies allocated to the
domestic cellular radio telecommunications service,
(B) readily being altered by the user to receive transmissions in
such frequencies, or
(C) being equipped with decoders that convert digital cellular
transmissions to analog voice audio.
(2) Beginning 1 year after the effective date of the regulations
adopted . . ., no receiver having [such] capabilities ... shall be
manufactured in the United States or imported for use in the United
States.
47 U.S.C. § 302a(d).
41. See Dricks, supra note 33, at Al.
42. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In federal courts,
the attorney-client privilege is "governed by the principles of the common law"
developed by the courts. FED. R. Evm. 501. In state cases, and in federal civil
cases sitting in diversity, state law supplies the rules of decision regarding the
establishment of a confidential privilege. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
[Vol. 24
Privacy on Cellular Communications
he could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be un-
derstood by the attorney as so intended. ' ' 43 Although a client may
assume that his attorney understands the client's desire for confiden-
tiality, the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy surrounding
radio wave communications may, in fact, prevent the privilege from
attaching. The following parts of this Comment examine the statutory
and case law of various jurisdictions that have addressed whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy surrounds cordless and cellular
communications.
A. Federal Law
In 1986, the United States Congress comprehensively overhauled
federal wiretap law with the enactment of the ECPA," which was
designed to protect and secure the privacy of wire and oral com-
munications between individuals. 45 Among other things, the ECPA
prohibits the willful interception or willful use of "wire" or "oral"
communications. 6 Although the interception of all wire communi-
cations is prohibited by the ECPA, interception of oral communi-
cations is only prohibited if made under circumstances justifying an
expectation of privacy. 47
The federal circuits are divided as to whether communications
on cellular or cordless telephones" fall within the definitions of "oral"
43. 1 JOHN WrLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91, at 333 (4th ed.
1992).
44. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 101-
303, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-
26).
45. Edwards, 632 F. Supp. at 587; Congressional Findings Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211-12 (1968) (observing that wire communications
form an interstate network susceptible to substantial eavesdropping and inter-
ception of wire, electronic, and oral communications; the purpose of the ECPA
is to protect the privacy of such communications).
46. The ECPA defines wire and oral communications as follows:
(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole
or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of com-
munications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception ... furnished or
operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation,
but such term does not include any electronic communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2) (1995).
47. Edwards, 632 F. Supp. at 587.
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or "wire" communications provided by federal statute.4 In United
States v. Hall,49 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a communication was protected as a "wire" com-
munication if one party was on a cellular car phone and the other
on a land-based line.50 The Hall court's decision was based on its
interpretation of Congress's intent in enacting the federal wiretap
statute.5' In addition, the Hall court held that whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation where both parties
were using radio telephones required a factual inquiry by the trial
judge, and, thus, the court of appeals remanded the case.52 Since
then, other federal courts have disregarded the Hall court's "one
party" view and have even declared the Ninth Circuit's holding
"absurd."53
The majority of federal courts now hold that there is no expec-
tation of privacy in radio wave communications, whether one or
both of the parties communicate by a cordless or cellular telephone.5 4
48. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has yet to address this issue.
49. 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973).
50. Id. In Hall, the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) was informed of'
suspicious conversations overheard by a Tuscon housewife on her eight band,
150-170 megacycle radio. Id. at 194. DPS subsequently began its own moni-
toring of the defendants' cordless phone conversations. Id. Three men who
were convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute appealed
their convictions on the grounds that the warrantless search of their cordless
phone conversations conducted by the DPS violated 18 U.S.C. § 2510, which
was overhauled in 1986 by the EPCA. Id. at 193. The convictions were
overturned by the Ninth Circuit, which concluded that communications from
a wireless telephone to a land-based line were wire communications and afforded
the full protection of 18 U.S.C. § 2510. Id. at 198-99. The case was remanded
to determine whether the conversations were oral or wire communications and,
if oral, whether the parties had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient
for protection under the statute. Id. at 199.
51. Id. at 196-98 (stating that "we have closely examined the legislative history of
Title III and have found no indication of how Congress intended to treat a
radio-telephone conversation. In the absence of such an indication, we must
conclude that, if the conversation involves a land-line telephone, it is a wire
communication") (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 198. The Hall court noted that the trial "judge made a specific finding
that Hall and Nichols knew they could be heard by other people and had no
right of privacy." Id.
53. Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La.) ("Surely the Congress
did not intend such an absurd result."), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986).
54. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the defendant failed to prove that his expectation of privacy in a cordless
phone conversation was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; the court
opined in dicta, however, that a more technologically advanced cordless phone
may acquire a societal recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy
sufficient for Fourth Amendment protection), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1620
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Edwards v. Bardwell" is illustrative of the view of a majority of the
federal circuits. In Edwards, a cordless phone communication be-
tween the criminal defendant, Edwards, and his attorney, was inter-
cepted by an unnamed informant and was turned over to the United
States District Attorney, Stanford 0. Bardwell1 6 Although Edwards
sued Bardwell and the informant in a civil action alleging violations
of the ECPA, he lost on summary judgment on the grounds that
the ECPA did not protect his cellular communications. 7 The Edwards
court, however, did order that the contents of the communication
be placed under seal, reasoning that the contents "should be main-
tained as confidential ' 5 8 even though the court noted that the com-
munication may or may not have qualified as a privileged
communication "because of the method used to broadcast it." 9
B. State Law
At least forty-two state legislatures have enacted wiretap laws
that are based upon the federal ECPA. 60 At present, the appellate
(1993), Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1022 (1990). In Tyler, a cordless phone conversation to an unknown receiver
was intercepted by one of Tyler's neighbors. Id. at 705. Information heard
during the interception subsequently provided the basis for the ensuing criminal
charges against Tyler. Id. at 706. Although Tyler sued his neighbor for civil
violations of the ECPA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the summary judgment against Tyler. Id. at 707; see also
United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1970) (communicating
via a cellular car phone provides no reasonable expectation of privacy), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); United States v. Carr, 805 F. Supp. 1266
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications via at least one cordless phone and either a cordless or land-
based line).
55. 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 585.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 589-90.
59. Id. at 589.
60. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to -37 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.37.010 to
.130, 42.20.300 to .390 (Supp. 1994); AR=. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to -
3017 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (Michie 1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 629 to 637.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-15-101 to -104, 18-9-302 to -305 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to -189, 54-41a to -41t (West 1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1987 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01 to .10 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to -69 (1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-
41 to -48 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to -6709 (1987 & Supp.
1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/108B-1 to 108B-7 (Smith-Hurd 1992
& Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808B (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2518 (1988 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
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courts in six of these jurisdictions have confronted the issue of
whether recorded cellular or cordless communications are admissible
into evidence; four of these jurisdictions have followed the majority
of the federal circuits and have held such conversations admissible. 61
In Salmon v. State,62 the Georgia Court of Appeals followed
the majority of the federal circuits. The case involved a defendant
§§ 15:1302 to :1312 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 709 - 713 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §
99 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01 to .13 (West
1983 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to -537 (1993 & Supp.
1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 542.400 to .422 (Vernon Supp. 1995); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.410 to .515,
200.610 to .690 (Michie 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A.1 to -. 11 (1986
& Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-2 to -24 (West 1985 & Supp.
1995); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 700.20 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 250.00 to .05 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995); 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 407;
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-01 to -04 (1985 & Supp. 1991); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2933.51 to .66 (Baldwin 1993 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 176.2 to .13 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721 to .739 (1993);
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5781 (1983 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-35-21, -24, 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-
35A-1 to -34 (1988 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-601 to -604,
40-6-301 to -310 (Supp. 1994); TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. §§ 123.001
- .003 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 16.01 - .05 (West
1994); TEX. CODE CRnI. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -16 (1995 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
61 to -70.3 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030 - .140 (West
1988 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-ID-1 to -16 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27 - .33 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); WYo. STAT. §§
7-3-601 to -610 (1995).
61. Compare Salmon v. State, 426 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that a recording via cellular telephone to land-based line by radio receiver is
permissible); People v. Wilson, 554 N.E.2d 545, 552 (I11. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that a recording of a conversation on two mobile car phones overheard
by anonymous informant is admissible as evidence in subsequent murder trial),
appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. 1990); State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197, 206
(Kan. 1984) (holding that recording a cordless telephone conversation, made
to unknown location by radio receiver, is permissible) and State v. Smith, 438
N.W.2d 571, 573 (Wis. 1989) (holding that a recording via cordless telephone
to unknown locations by radio scanner is permissible) with Mozo v. State, 632
So. 2d 623, 631-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a recording of a
cordless telephone conversation by a police officer violated Article I, sections
12 and 23, of the Florida State Constitution, which accords explicit protection
for private communications) and State v. Fata, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (N.Y.
App. Div.) (holding that the interception and subsequent recording of a cordless
telephone conversation violated New York's eavesdropping statute, which in-
tended greater protection for the privacy of cordless communications than that
given by the ECPA), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1990).
62. 426 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
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who recorded a police officer's cellular phone conversation with the
defendant's drug supplier in a reverse sting operation. 6 The defendant
attempted to use the recording to impeach the police officer's testi-
mony.64 The trial court suppressed the recorded conversation, finding
that it violated the Georgia wiretap statute. 65 Because the Salmon
court concluded that cellular communications were not expressly
protected by the statute, it then examined whether the communica-
tions were private. 66 The court stated that the legislative intent was
to protect only private communications and that cellular telephones
were not private because they transmited FM radio waves for anyone
to hear.67 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that "cellular telephone
users ha[d] no justifiable expectation of privacy."68
In contrast, in People v. Fata,69 the appellate division of the
New York Supreme Court held that users of cordless telephones were
protected from searches and seizures under New York law, even
though the users of such telephones lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy.70 In Fata, an off-duty police officer overheard a cordless
telephone conversation emanating from a neighboring apartment. 7'
Because the conversation included narcotic related jargon, the officer
proceeded to record additional conversations that were turned over
to the narcotics task force.7 2 Based on the recorded conversations
and additional, substantial evidence, the task force obtained warrants
leading to the arrest and conviction of the defendant. 73 The defendant
appealed his conviction. 74
The Fata court recognized that cordless phone communications
were susceptible to eavesdropping, thereby resulting in a loss of
63. Id. at 161.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Georgia wiretap statute provides, in part, that "[i]t shall be unlawful
for: . . . (4) Any person intentionally and secretly to intercept by the use of
any device, instrument or apparatus the contents of a message sent by telephone,
telegraph, letter, or by any other means of private communication." GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-62 (1992).
66. Salmon, 426 S.E.2d at 162.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y.
1990).
70. Id. at 349-52 (holding that intentional interceptions of cordless transmissions
are prohibited by New York law). Suppression of the evidence was unnecessary,
however, because the defendant's arrest warrant was sufficiently supported by
independent evidence; therefore, the conviction was affirmed. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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privacy." Nevertheless, the Fata court determined that, unlike the
ECPA, New York law did not require a reasonable expectation of
privacy for cordless communications to be protected.76 Rather, the
New York statute prohibited the intentional interception of telephonic
communications by means of any instrument or device. 77 Because the
court interpreted the definition of telephonic communications to
include cordless phone transmissions, the defendant's conversations
were protected from interception despite the lack of privacy in his
communication. 78 The Fata court held that the plain meaning of the
statute should be interpreted to include an ordinary radio or cordless
telephone from which a conversation is overheard. 79
Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act8° [here-
inafter MWESA] is an offspring of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.81 Since MWESA's codification, Maryland
appellate courts have not ruled on whether cordless or cellular
communications are protected communications in which a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists. MWESA states that, in Maryland, it
is unlawful to "[w]illfully intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic
communication;" the question is whether a cordless or cellular tele-
phonic communication is a "wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion. "82
MWESA explicitly excludes cordless communications from "wire
communications" and "electronic communications." 83 Under
MWESA, for a cordless communication to fall within the ambit of
an "oral communication," the conversation must be "spoken to or
by any person in private conversation. '" Therefore, the issue is, as
in federal and state courts, whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in cordless communications. 85
Due to the weight of authority against the proposition that there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy in cordless communications 86
75. Id.
76. Id. at 351.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -414 (1995).
81. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, Stat. 212 (1968). See generally State v. Bailey, 289
Md. 143, 151, 422 A.2d 1021, 1026 (1980).
82. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1).
83. Id. § 10-401()(iii). As stated therein, a .'[w]ire communication' does not
include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit." Id.
Similarly, an "electronic communication" does not include: "1. The radio
portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the
cordless telephone handset and the base unit." Id. § 10-401(11)(ii).
84. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401(2)(i) (emphasis added).
85. See supra Part IV. A., B.
86. See supra note 54.
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and the General Assembly's specific exclusion of cordless phones
from "wire" and "electronic communications," 7 it should follow
that Maryland courts will strictly construe MWESA and leave cordless
communications without a protective umbrella of privacy. Thus,
cordless communications will likely be susceptible to warrantless
searches and eavesdropping.
MWESA is less clear regarding cellular communications. MWESA
permits the interception of electronic communications that are "read-
ily accessible to the general public" '' and the interception of "any
radio communication that is transmitted ... [b]y a station operating
on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur,
citizens band, or general mobile radio services." '8 9 To be "[r]eadily
accessible to the general public .. .with respect to a radio commu-
nication," the communication must not be scrambled, encrypted or
"[t]ransmitted using modulation techniques the essential parameters
of which have been withheld from the public with the intention of
preserving the privacy of the communication. '" 90 Because cellular
telephones transmit via radio waves and, generally, do not have
scrambling or encryption devices, communications transmitted to or
from cellular phones seem to be left out of the scope of protection
granted by the Maryland General Assembly. 9'
V. APPLYING CASE LAW TO THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Because the majority of jurisdictions have held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in radio wave communications, 92
attorneys must be wary of the vulnerability of cellular or cordless
communications with their clients. Inasmuch as the Model Rules
require an attorney to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation," 93 the burden falls upon the attorney to inform
the client of the vulnerability of communications across cordless or
cellular phones. 94 A failure to inform the client of the vulnerabilities
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 10-402(7)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 10-401(15)(i)-(ii).
91. See infra Part VI (concerning suggestions for encryption, scrambling, and other
methods of ensuring the privacy of cellular communications).
92. See supra note 54.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987).
94. Joanne Pitulla, Perils of Office Tech, 77 A.B.A. J. 102 (Oct. 1991) (observing
the conclusion of the Illinois State Bar Association that a client has a reasonable
right to presume that a communication with his attorney is confidential).
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of radio wave communications could result in the destruction of the
attorney-client privilege, depending upon the jurisdiction in which
the attorney practices. 95 If a client's conviction or the loss of a case
turns on the revelation of radio wave communications with his
attorney, the attorney may be liable for malpractice by breaching his
duty of confidentiality96 or by failing to inform the client of the
vulnerability of the communication.Y Additionally, the attorney may
be subjected to a disciplinary hearing before the grievance commission
of the respective jurisdiction, which might ultimately result in the
attorney's reprimand, suspension, or disbarment. 98
95. See Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1987).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987); see supra Part III; ABA STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 7.2 (1986) (providing for an
attorney's suspension if the attorney knowingly violates a professional duty
causing injury or potential injury to the attorney's client); Standard 4.2
(providing for attorney's reprimand where the attorney negligently violates a
professional duty).
98. The standard by which sanctions are levied against an attorney for misconduct
are as follows:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the factors set out in 3.0 ('the duty violated; the lawyer's mental state;
and the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct;
and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors) the following
sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to
preserve confidences:
4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information
relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted
to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury
to a client.
4.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
reveals information relating to the representation of a client not
otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes
injury or potential injury to a client.
4.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently
reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise
lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes injury or
potential injury to a client.
4.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently
reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise
lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes little or
no actual or potential injury to a client.
ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 4.2 (1986); cf.
Harris v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 608, 625 A.2d 941, 947 (1993);
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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VI. METHODS OF PROTECTING RADIO WAVE
COMMUNICATIONS
As suggested by United States v. Smith,99 a more technologically
advanced cordless phone may acquire a societal recognition of a
reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to afford Fourth Amend-
ment protection.100 Advancements in digital technology, which have
been incorporated into the most recent generation of cellular phones,
may provide cellular communication with a reasonable expectation
of privacy.101 A second method that can be used to ensure the
confidentiality of radio wave communication is to "scramble" the
communications at a cost of approximately $600 per scrambling
device.' ° The Massachusetts Bar Association is the first in the nation
to offer its members discounted scrambling of cellular phone calls.103
Finally, the most expensive, yet most effective, means of protecting
radio wave communications is to use an encryption device.
1°4
VII. CONCLUSION
Due to the recent nature of cellular technology, case law deciding
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy surrounds radio com-
99. 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1620 (1993).
100. Id. at 180.
101. See Joia Shillingford, Cutting the Cost of Calling - Mobile Phones, FIN. TIMEs
LTD., Oct. 26, 1994, at VII; Cellular One Introduces First Digital Voice Cellular
Network in Minnesota, PR NEwswIE Ass'N, INC., Oct. 18, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("Unlike analog, which carries voice
patterns over radio waves, the digital process literally encodes a conversation
into 'ones and zeros,' compresses it and sends it across the airwaves, then
converts it back to sound. Therefore, digital greatly enhances the privacy of a
voice channel."); Digital Cellular Growth Picks up Speed; Sprint Goes with
CDMA, ADVANCED WIRELEss TECHNOLOGIES, Sept. 14, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (stating that digital cellular phone service
"offer[s] better security against eavesdropping").
102. See James J. Harrison, Jr., Plugging Cellular Leaks, THE RECORDEk, July 9,
1993, at 6. Harrison notes that many scrambling devices require the party to
whom the call has been placed to have a de-scrambler. Id.; Service to Block
Eavesdropping on Cellular Phones, N.Y. TmEs, Apr. 28, 1993, at D4 (Estimates
on cellular scrambler devices would be $600 with "$5 a month [for the service
plus] 95 cents a minute, in addition to normal cellular charges.").
103. Cycom International: Massachusetts Bar First in Nation To Scramble Members'
Cellular Phone Calls, PR NEwswuE, Sept. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; see Michael Causey, Lawyers Using the Internet To Woo
and Keep Customers, DAmY REc., Nov. 12, 1994, at 13 (noting that "Mas-
sachusetts is generally recognized as a state leader in promoting Internet use").
104. See generally James J. Harrison, Jr., Plugging Cellular Leaks, TiE RECORDER,
July 9, 1993, at 6 (noting that encryption devices, such as the Motorola Secure
Telephone Unit-III, cost $2000 to $3000 per unit); Dan Seeney, The Wages of
Fear: Marketing Cellular Encryption, CELLuAR Bus., Dec. 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws Files (providing a general, yet complete, over-
view of available security measures which may be taken by cellular phone
users, including encryption).
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munications is scarce and is silent as to whether an attorney may be
subject to malpractice or disciplinary action for inadvertent disclo-
sures of confidential information. Nonetheless, an attorney should
strive not only to maintain the minimum standards of the profession
imposed by the Rules of Professional Responsibility but should also
take the precautions necessary to protect the attorney-client privilege
and all confidences and secrets entrusted to him. Attorneys should
advise their clients to communicate via land-based lines of commu-
nication. Land-based lines clearly fall within the protection of the
ECPA and MWESA, thus creating a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such communications.
Alternatively, as suggested by the Maryland Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Act,os an attorney may also wish to scramble
or encrypt his client communications in an effort to preserve the
privacy of the communications. These additional precautions will
protect the attorney from potential sanctions, liability, and the loss
of clients. The cost of these precautions seems a small price to pay
when weighed against the severity of the consequences of an inter-
cepted phone call between an attorney and a client.
Anthony S. Higgins
105. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1).
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